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HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE CONTROL
OF WAGES IN WISCONSIN
WILLIAMi L. CROW*
W ITH the general growth of population in the United States and
the rise of an urban civilization out of a rapidly developing fac-
tory system, the doctrine of individualism as a philosophy of business
enterprise was by the very nature of events forced to make way for a
new theory of governmental regulation. This new theory, coupled with
the entry of women in large numbers into the labor market, competing
not only among themselves but also in many instances with men, forced
the question of compensation into the spotlight, with the result that
shortly after the beginning of the present century a substantial legis-
lative interest was created in the establishment of minimum wage
levels.
Out of this interest two types of state wage control have developed
in practice.' One can be designated as rigid compulsory control, th law
setting an absolute standard of minimum compensation in industry, and
providing penalties for the failure of employers to attain such stand-
ard, as illustrated by the former law of Arkansas.' The other is flexible
administrative control in which the general policy is determined by the
legislature, with the power of classification of industry and the deter-
mination of reasonable wage levels lodged in an administrative agency,
consisting of either a single individual or a commission. These flexible
administrative controls differ as to the manner of enforcement. One is
non-compulsory in that the only penalty for failure to comply with the
agency's order is the pressure of public opinion 3 ; the 9ther is compul-
sory in that a failure to comply with the orders results in the applica-
tion of specific legal remedies.
Wisconsin employs the flexible compulsory administrative type of
control, the operating agency being an industrial commission of three
members.
The records indicate that there have been no successful legislative
interferences with this system, although three abortive attempts would
*Graduate Fellow, University of Chicago Law School; Professor of Govern-
ment, Lawrence College.
1 Cf. A, N. Holcombe, The Effects of the Legal Mininunn W4age for Women,
Ann. Am. Academy, Vol. 69, pp. 34-41.
2 Chapter 107, Section 552, Digest of the Statutes (1916). An illustrative sen-
tence reads: "All female workers who have had six months' practicable ex-
perience in any line of industry or labor shall be paid not less than one dollar
and twenty-five cents per day."
3 Chapter 706 Massachusetts acts of 1912.
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have the effect of depriving the commission of a considerable amount
of its usefulness. Two bills, one in 19154, and the other in 19175 were
simple attempts to substitute a definite minimum in place of the deter-
mination of the commission, while a bill in 19198 would leave to a jury
the determination of the amount of the living wage and reasonable
compensation, the living wage under this bill not only providing for
a reasonable standard of comfort so far as the necessaries of life are
concerned, but, in addition, being sufficient for "reasonable leisure,
education and entertainment." The penalty for the employer's non-
compliance was to be an action by the attorney-general, upon a report
by the commission, to abate as a public nuisance the business of such
employers, but upon a finding that the business was essential and un-
able to pay a living wage under private management, the property must
be condemned and then operated by the state. •
While the idea of wage control is a very old one,7 the first appli-
cation of the minimum wage principle under the factory system was in
Victoria, Australia, under a law enacted in 18968, and was next applied
in 1909 in Great Britain9. In these countries it was confined only to
certain industries at first, although the success of the experiment led
to an extension of its scope.10
Beginning in 1911, the idea of minimum wage control made prog-
ress in the United States"1 , Wisconsin leading with a legislative pro-
posal to include male adults as well as women and children, the bill
being so well-prepared that it received favorable comment in various
parts of the country.
1 2-
4 Assembly Bill 666A.
5 Assembly Mill 64A.
6 Assembly Bill 145A.
7 After the Black Death in England in 1349 the maxinmuin wages of certain
laborers were regulated by what is known as the Statute of Laborers. It
states that the laborer "shall take only the wages which were accustomed to
be taken in the neighborhood where is is bound to serve." J. R. Green, Short
History of the English People, New York, 1897, p. 249.
8 See Elizabeth G. Evans, A Case for Minimnenr Wage Boards, The Survey,
Vol. 31, January 10, 1914, p. 440.
9 The Trade Boards Act, 1909. (9 Edw. 7, c. 22.)
10 The Survey, op. cit., p. 440.
11 No state in the United States adopted minimum wage control before 1912;
one state in 1912; and eight states in 1913. For a complete list, see Bulletin of
Women's Bureau, No. 61, U. S. Department of Labor, Appendix A.
12 * * * It is so carefully thought out and even the constitutional objections so
plausibly met, that it will not do to dismiss it as the mere vagary of a social-
istic state." F. J. Stimson in The Boston Evening Transcript, March 22, 1911.
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The main provisions of this bill, which was called by a Harvard
professor a "shrewd piece of effective legislation,"'13 reads as follows:
"All employment property is hereby declared to be affected with a
public interest to the extent that every employer shall pay to every
employee in each oppressive employment at least a living wage. No
employer shall fail or neglect to pay to every employee in each oppres-
sive employment at least a living wage."' 14
As for the definition of important terms, 'employment property'
was to mean "physical property used for the production and sale for
profit of products of labor hired for wages ;" 'oppressive employment'
was to mean "an occupation in which employees are unable to earn a
living wage ;" and a 'living wage' was to be construed hs "such com-
pensation for labor performed under reasonable conditions as shall en-
able employees to secure for themselves and those who are or may be
reasonably dependent upon them the necessary comforts of life."' 5
The enforcement of the proposed law was to be given to the com-
missioner of labor,16 with power to ascertain what was to be an oppres-
sive employment, to issue a license to employers using labor in an
oppressive employment, and to revoke the license in case the employer
"has paid or is paying less than the living wage stated therein," or has
failed to do certain other prescribed things.
This legislation embodied certain established concepts and prin-
ciples.'7 Concerning oppression, Professor Fruend had said: "The
theory of legislative interference seems to be in some cases that oppres-
sion is, in itself, like fraud, immoral and a wrong either against the
individual affected thereby or against the public at large."' 18 "Necessary
comforts of life," used as the fundamental standard for a living wage,
appears in the constitution of Wisconsin, although it is employed there
in connection with the privilege of debtors ;19 and to justify the asser-
tion of legislative control over private property, there was a resort to
the well known doctrine of "property affected with a public interest"
-a doctrine first given currency in the United States in the case of
Munn v. Illinois.20 While the property in that case which was affected
13 A. N. Holcombe, Minjimum Wage Board, The Survey, Vol. 26, p. 32.
14 Senate Bill, 317S.
' Ibid, Section 1.
16 The appointment was authorized by Chapter 319, Laws of 1883.
17 See Constitutionality of the Proposed Law by Katherine Lenroot in a bulletin
prepared for the Wisconsin Consumers League under the direction of John R.
Commons, 1911.
Is The Police Power, p. 285.
"9Article I, Section 17.
20 (1876) 94 U. S. 113.
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with a public interest was a monopoly-an elevator "at the gateway of
commerce,"-the language used in the majbrity decision was broad
enough to give comfort to those interested in the extension of the
doctrine.
"Property," says Chief Justice Waite, "does become clothed with
a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public conse-
quence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one de-
votes his property to a use in which the public has an interest he, in
effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to
be controlled by the public for the common good." 21
It seems to be quite apparent from subsequent interpretations of
the application of the doctrine that the legislature would have met a
constitutional obstacle in the assumption of such general control. It was
pointed out in a later case 22 that a mere legislative declaration that
property is so affected is not conclusive; that the relation between the
employer and the public must be "peculiarly close ;" and that the cir-
cumstances must "raise an affirmative obligation" on the employer's
part to deal in a reasonable way with the public. Furthermore, it was
emphasized that it had never been thought that a State might regulate
ordinary business activities such as those of the butcher, baker, or
tailor.
Another constitutional question was raised by the provision that,
"Every order of the commissioner of labor classifying oppressive
employments and fixing a living wage shall become operative thirty
days after its publication,"
in that there was a delegation of legislative power to the commissioner.
But in 1911 opinion was well-crystalized, 2 3 and the Supreme Court of
the United States had made some authoritative statements regarding
the constitutionality of such legislation,'24 although the question was not
finally settled in Wisconsin until 1916 ;2" and it is still the contention
21 Ibid, p. 126.
22 Wolff Packing Company v. Industrial Court, (1923) 262 U. S. 522, 536.
23 "Before these (administrative) agencies the old doctrine prohibiting the dele-
gation of legislative power has virtually retired from'the field and given up
the fight." Elihu Root, Public Service at the Bar, Reports of the American
Bar Association, Vol. XLI, (1916) p. 368.
24U. S. v. Grimaud, (1910) 220 U. S. 506. In Marshall Field & Company v.
Clark (1892) 143 U. S. 694, the court, speaking through Mir. Justice Harlan,
quoting from Locke's Appeal, 72 Penn. St. 491, 498, said: "The legislature
cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate
a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes
or intends to make its own action depend." Page 694.
5 State v. Lange Canning Company, (1916) 164 Wis. 228.
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of at least one eminent Wisconsin jurist that the constitutionality was
supported in response to social forces rather than to the effectiveness
of legal argument.
26
The objection from an economic point of view to the definition of
a living wage as one that "shall enable employees to secure for them-
selves and those who are or may be reasonably dependent upon them
the necessary comforts of life" seems quite serious. The living wage
for each employee would as a result of the application of this defini-
tion be a variable having relation to the number of his or her depend-
ents. Laying aside the difficulties inherent in the determination of
such a wage, it is quite probable that under such a law an employer
would engage in discriminatory activities by employing those with no
or few dependents, thus creating a new economic evil commensurate
with or greater than the evil to be remedied.
However, the constitutional and economic questions were never an-
swered in an authoritative way as the bill failed of enactment, and the
fears of those who saw conservatism and laissez-faireism too firmly
rooted at a time in economic evolution when the evil fruits of industry
were getting too ripe were at least temporarily justified, 27 although a
change so far as minimum wage control was concerned lay only two
years ahead.
Without allowing interest to wane, the Legislature of 1913 passed
a law dealing with a wage for women and minors containing these
principal features :28
1. Women and minors to be paid not less than a living wage.
2 9
2. Power in the industrial commission 30 to fix reasonable classi-
26 "* * * those who have opposed the creation and extension of administrative
tribunals have as a rule had the best of the argument on legal and constitu-
tional grounds, but have been obliged to yield to an irresistible social pres-
sure." Marvin B. Rosenberry, Ad-miinistrative Law and the Constitution, The
American Political Science Review, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, February, 1929.
27 Referring to this proposed Wisconsin legislation, it was said: "To a large
proportion of American voters such legislation will seem socialistic or pater-
nalistic to an absurd and dangerous limit * * * It (this idea) is rooted in
the notion, which was once a true account of the facts, that this is a land in
which every man who is good for anything has his chance, and it should be
our patriotic care to maintain a job of the non-paternalistic type, interfering
as little as possible with private initiative and management." Editorial, The
Independent, Vol. 70, p. 806.
28 Chapter 712.
29 Governor McGovern suggested that in the beginning there should be experi-
mentation in a limited field, dealing with the wages of women employees in
the "most oppressive occupations." Message of Francis E. McGovern, (1913).
30 Created by Laws of 1911, ch. 485, as the successor to the bureau of labor
statistics established in 1883.
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fications, to determine the living wage and to issue general and special
orders.
3. The appointment of an advisory wage board representing em-
ployers, employees, and the public.
4. Provision for a license permitting those unable to earn a living
wage to work commensurate with their ability.
5. Power in the industrial commission to obtain information from
employers, the employer himself to keep a record of women and minors
employed and the wages paid.
6. Power in the industrial commission upon complaint that less
than a living wage had been paid to investigate and to take necessary
proceedings to enforce payment of a wage not less than a living wage.
As a matter of historical interest, the first minimum wage law in
this country was passed in Massachusetts, 311 but the payment of a mini-
mum wage was not made compulsory. The commission was empowered
only to recommend that a certain amount be recognized as a minimum
wage, the pressure upon the employer to pay such a wage being the
publicity given to the recommendation of the commission, although a
newspaper refusing to publish its findings might be subjected to a
penalty. In Wisconsin the commission was given the power of direct
enforcement.
The Wisconsin law of 1913 showed considerable improvement over
the proposed legislation of 1911. No attempt was made to regulate the
wages of male adults, a feature of doubtful constitutionality.3 2 An in-
dustrial commission had been substituted for a commissioner of labor,
thus broadening the base of administrative control. An additional safe-
guard in the interest of justice was the creation of an advisory wage
board, with representation on the part of all those whose interests were
being controlled. There was, furthermore, a provision for those who,
because of special reasons, were not capable of earning a living wage. 33
And, finally, the economic objection to the previous bill was met by
the establishment of a living wage that had relation to the individual's
cost of living, irrespective of dependents.
After this law had been declared unconstitutional so far as it applied
31 Chapter 706, Acts of 1912.
32 The Supreme Court of the United State has never had occasion to pass upon
the constitutionality of minimum wage laws for men. However, the language
in Lochner v. New York, (1904) 198 U. S. 45, 61, would seem to be signifi-
cant. Chief Justice Taft, with judicial caution, refrains from expressing any
opinion that a minimumwage low hight be enacted for adult men. Adkins v.
Childrens' Hospital, (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 566.
33 The policy of the commission is to grant licenses only in those cases where
physical and mental defects are revealed. Biennial Report of the Industrial
Commission, 1918-20, p. 63.
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to adult women, 34 the Legislature of 1925 proceeded to amend it by
adopting the following provision :35
"No wage paid or agreed to be paid by an employer to any adult
female employe shall be oppressive. Any wage lower than a reasonable
or adequate compensation for the services rendered shall be deemed
oppressive and is hereby prohibited."
Again, the industrial commission was given power, and placed under
a duty to investigate as to oppressive and unjust wages, and to issue
orders upon the basis of its findings.
While under the old law the wages paid to adult women must have
a relation to the cost of living, under the new one there must be a rela-
tion to the employe's efficiency of service, as the expression, "reason-
able or adequate compensation for the service rendered," would clearly
indicate.
Another new feature was incorporated in the law showing some
solicitude for the employer, but undoubtedly based, in view of the
policy of minimum wage legislation, on the theory that it is better for
the employee to receive some compensation than to be thrown out of
work entirely by the retirement of the employer because of economic
reasons. The law embodying this feature runs as follows :36
"The commission shall * * * grant to an employer a license to em-
ploy adult females at less than the wage so determined if said employer
shall satisfactorily establish that he is unable to pay such wage, but the
inefficiency of the employer shall not be a ground for granting such
license."
Two other states-Massachusetts 37 and Nebraska 34--granted ex-
emption of this nature under their minimum wage laws, but in these
states permits were obtained from the courts.
With flexible administrative control established by the law of 1913,
it was necessary for the commission to begin its fact-finding activities.
The advisory wage board, with its broad basis of representation, to
which reference has already been made, was duly constituted. The
research of the commission was not only extensive in its territorial
application, but touched in a comprehensive manner the points having
34 Folding Furniture Works, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, (1924) 300 Fed. 991.
35 Chapter 176, Laws of 1925.
36 Chapter 176, Laws of 1925.
37 Chapter 706, section 6, Laws of 1912
3 Chapter 211, section 6, Laws of 1913.
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a necessary bearing upon the cost of living and employee efficiency. 39
In connection with its fact-finding activities, the commission en-
countered some very real difficulties with special industries in the
administration of the minimum wage law, illustrating legislative inade-
quacy in applying the principle of direct rigid control. For example, it
was found that telephone companies, large and small, rendered twenty-
four hour service, with more or less intermittent calls, depending to a
certain extent upon the size of the exchange. The basis of payment
worked out was that the telephone companies must pay their operators
for all of the time that could not be employed productively in some
other field, and that night operators must be compensated for all of
the time during which they were unable to obtain uninterrupted rest.
It was also discovered that when the telephone exchanges were located
in private homes a rate per telephone was more reasonable than an
hourly rate. Night telephone work also presented a peculiar problem
due to the varying sizes of the exchanges.
40
Other industries presented their peculiar problems of control. Due
to special conditions in sanitariums where women were theoretically on
duty from twelve to twenty-fours hours a day, the commission found
that the most reasonable basis of compensation must have a relation to
a minimum number of hours per week.41 In the tobacco stemming busi-
ness wh~re elderly women were customarily employed, it was discov-
ered that compensation on a piece basis was the most reasonable.
42
There was also a special problem connected with work let out by fac-
tories to be done at home. In this instance the discovery was made that
the basis of compensatiof should also be in terms of piece-rates, the
rate having a relation to the compensation to be earned by an employee
of average ability on an hourly basis.
43
As a result of its activities, the commission has established certain
well-defined principles. It has emphasized the necessity of a thorough
investigation of the facts bearing upon wage control, coupled with a
complete opportunity for everyone to give his views before a decision
39 These points included occupation, length of time in the industry, education,
previous occupations, special training, amount and causes of unemployment
during, the past twelve months, wages received at the beginning of work and
at the time of the investigation, the family and living conditions, the amount
paid for room and board or contributions to the family, the cost of standard
articles of clothing and staple articles of food, and estimates from the women
themselves of annual expenditures. Report of Industrial Commission, Cost of
Living of Wage Earning Women in Wisconsin, (1916) p. 2.
40 Biennial Report of the Industrial Commission, 1918-20, pp. 60-62.
41 Ibid, p. 62.
42 Ibid, p. 63.
43 Ibid, p. 66.
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is made.4 4 Industry can be raised to a higher plane through the educa-
tional value of investigation and the establishment of minimum stand-
ards. Progress comes with reiterated advice regarding the ultimate
economy of paying a living wage. 5 Again, wage regulation must look
to causes as well as results, the efficiency of the employee being the
ultimate goal.4 6 In the determination of more specific wage-control
principles, the commission was committed because of the necessities of
the case to a differentiation of compensation bases in certain industries,
but found that the basic compensation must be measured per hour in-
stead of per day. This was because it was found that those who worked
shorter hours were able to do a great deal or all of their own work at
home while those who worked longer hours were compelled to hire it
done for them.47
On April 9, 1923, the Supreme Court of the United States held a
minimum wage law for women in the District of Columbia unconstitu-
tiona 4 8, although a previous decision of the same tribunal with an
evenly divided court upheld a similar minimum wage law in the state
of Oregon.4 1 However, the commission met with no opposition in the
administration of the law until August 18, 1924, when the Folding
Furniture Works of Stevens Point, Wisconsin, obtained a federal in-
junction 50 restraining the commission from the further enforcement
of the law as it affected adult women in its factory. This decision was
based upon the fact that the law of Wisconsin was similar to the law
of the District of Columbia.
As a consequence of this decision, as has been stated, the Legisla-
ture of 1925 passed the oppressive wage law for women.51 changing
the principle of control from the cost of living to efficiency of service.
It is interesting to observe that Wisconsin has been the only state to
44 Report on Allied Functions, 1918, p. 42.
45 Report on Allied Functions, 1917, p. 39.
46 "The underlying issue is largely the question of training for efficiency. The
problem can be solved only through the cooperation of the employers in de-
vising means of promoting the interests of the workers through increasing
their capacity and value." Report on Allied Functions, 1914, p. 60.
47The commission also refers to the fact that the principle of the hourly basis
was copied by Minnesota, and that the Supreme Court of that state had de-
cided that there is a real relation between hours of labor and cost of living.
Biennial Report of the Industrial Commission, 1918-20, p. 60. The Minnesota
decision referred to is G. 0. Miller Telephone Co. v. Minimum Wage Com-
mission, (1920) 145 Minn. 262. p. 271.
4sAdkins v. Children's Hospital, (1923) 261 U. S. 525.
49 Stettler v. O'Hara, (1916) 243 U. S. 629.
50 Folding Furniture Works, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, (1924) 300 Fed. 991.
51 See Senate Bill 20S, 1931, which would make the oppressive wage law apply
to all employees.
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resort to a different theory of wage control after the old law was found
to be unconstitutional.5 2 It is important to note, also, that inasmuch
as in the administration of the law of 1913 the commission not only
took into consideration the cost of living but the effect on industry,5
3
it could consistently under the new law, due to the existing correlation,
consider the cost of living in connection with efficiency of service. As a
matter of fact, the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the mini-
mum wage law has had no effect on minimum wage administration in
Wisconsin. It is stated that "pendhig a definite determination of op-
pressive wage levels, the Commission has advised employers that it
will not take action when the wages paid are equal to or above the
rate under the old law," 4 and that there has been complete compliance
with the enforcement of existing rates.55 That there might be some ad-
ministrative difficulties in case of non-compliance with the old rate is
easily understood. 56
Whether or not the new law is constitutional remains yet in the
realms of prophecy.57 The question has been raised,58 but there is some
support for its constitutionality in the dictum of Mr. Justice Suther-
land in the Adkins case when" he said that "a statute requiring an em-
ployer * * * even to pay with a fair relation to the extent of the bene-
fit obtained from the service would be understandable."5 9 However,
Wisconsin has found a way around a five to four decision 6 that would
52 Development of Minimum Wage Laws in the United States, 1912-27, Bulletin
of the Women's Bureau, No. 61, U. S. Department of Labor, p. 5.
53 Biennial Report of the Industrial Commission, 1928-30, p. 39.
5 Biennial Report of the Industrial Commission, 1924-26, p. 41; 1926-28, p. 44;
1928-30, p. 39.
55 Biennial Report of the Industrial Commission, 1928-30, p. 39.
56 Concerning this piece of Wisconsin legislation the following comment has been
made: "Difficult as it has been to determine the cost-of-living basis for set-
ting minimum rates, this seems a much more ambiguous statement on which
to base a rate." Bulletin of the Women's Bureau, No. 61, op. Cit., p. 5.
57 In the memorandum on Bill No. 20S, 1931, which is a duplicate of the law of
1925 except that it applied to all employees, it is said: "This bill attempts to
construct a minimum wage law on lines which may possibly be constitutional
* * * In the proposed draft, the precise language of the Supreme Court has
been quoted in the statement of the principle governing the minimum wage.
Even so, the court is very apt to hold the act unconstitutional." The consid-
eration of such bill puts a legislature in an unenviable position. On the one
side is the Scylla of no protection for male employees, while on the other is
the Charybdis of a probable contest on the point of constitutionality due to
such attempted protection.
58 Bulletin of the Women's Bureau, op. cit., p. 5.
39 (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 559.
60 The decision was actually five to three, Mr. Justice Brandeis not acting. How-
ever, his views in favor of minimum wage legislation were well known.
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have been as easily or perhaps more easily justified had one of the five
judges found himself by chance on the other side. The legislature of
Wisconsin has decided that wages of women must be controlled in the
interest of health, morality, and general welfare, and has thus by its
ingenuity, using some of the old concepts, and adopting the dictum of a
judge, circumvented the effect of a decision which by the operation of
the doctrine of the stare decises had annulled minimum wage legisla-
tion in twelve6 1 states. Wisconsin has in effect, a minimum wage law
although it is called an oppressive wage law.
61 This is not including Massachusetts where payment was not compulsory. See
Appendix A, Bulletin of the Wom en's Bureau, No. 61, op. cit.
